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United States v. Whizco: Are
SMCRA Obligations Dischargeable
Under the Bankruptcy Code?
INTRODUCTION
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)'
imposes rigorous technical standards on coal operators. Under
SMCRA's bonding program, operators must back approved
reclamation plans with financial responsibility agreements.
2
Congress included this program to encourage compliance. How-
ever, Congress has not passed upon the question of whether
SMCRA obligations are dischargeable under the Bankruptcy
Code.3
Consequently, great tension exists between the goals of the
Bankruptcy Code and SMCRA.4 The Bankruptcy Code aims to
provide debtors with a "fresh start" and to enable creditors to
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter cited as
SMCRA], Pub. L. N6. 95-87, 91 Stat. 447 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982
& Supp. V 1987)).
2 See SMCRA § 508, 30 U.S.C. § 1258 (requiring reclamation plans as part of
mine permit applications); SMCRA § 509, 30 U.S.C. § 1259 (mine permit issuance is
conditional upon execution of an approved bond which is in sufficient amount to
assure completion of the reclamation plan).
I Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-2657 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)).
4 Although this Comment deals with the conflict between the Bankruptcy Code
and SMCRA, the conflict may also involve other environmental statutes which allow
the government to obtain injunctive relief against polluters of all types. For example,
the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816-896, and amended Dec. 27,
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376) (1982
& Supp. V 1987)) authorizes "a civil action for appropriate relief, including a per-
manent or temporary injunction..." for violations of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982))
also provides for "such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may
require" when actual or threatened release of hazardous substances presents an "im-
minent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). See also infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text .
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recoup claims against the bankrupt estate. 5 On the other hand,
environmental statutes such as SMCRA attempt to protect pub-
lic health and safety.
6
The goals of the Code and SMCRA potentially conflict
when the government attempts to enforce an environmental
reclamation order against a bankrupt party.7 Specifically,
SMCRA authorizes the government to obtain injunctive relief
against surface miners of coal in the form of a court order to
reclaim mined land.8 Compliance with a reclamation order may
require the bankrupt party [the debtor] to spend money. 9 The
expenditure may interfere with the debtor's ability to obtain a
fresh start, a goal of the Bankruptcy Code. The expenditure
can also interfere with creditors' rights.' 0
Since the Bankruptcy Code does not specifically address
this conflict," the courts must determine if and when a recla-
mation order is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Numerous judicial
interpretations in this area will persist until Congress confronts
the problem.
The issues presented in United'States v. Whizco 12 illustrate
the ongoing tension between the Bankruptcy Code and envi-
ronmental statutes. In Whizco the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit largely resolved the conflict in favor
of the debtor. The court held that a bankrupt coal miner may
I Krasnow, Environmental Issues in a Bankruptcy or Reorganizational Proceed-
ing: A Bankruptcy Lawyer's Perspective, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10355,
10356 (1988).
6 Id.
7 See generally, United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988). But see
Baird, Environmental Regulation, Bankruptcy Law, and the Problem of Limited
Liability, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10352, 10355 (1988). Baird claims "[tihe
conflict between bankruptcy law and environmental law is largely illusory." Id.
SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(c).
Whizco, 841 F.2d 147.
10 In Whizco, the government's fight was with the bankrupt party. However,
the government often fights other creditors for the debtor's assets. Interestingly, these
other creditors may include different government agencies. See Firestone, Government
Perspectives on Bankruptcy and Environmental Law Interaction, 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10358 (1988).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 523. Section 523 lists nine obligations which are not discharged
by bankruptcy, including certain tax debts (§ 523(a)(1)); liability for fraud (§ 523(a)(2));
liability for embezzlement or larceny (§ 523(a)(4)); liability for willful or malicious
injury to another or to the property of another (§ 523(a)(6)); and liability to pay
certain fines, penalties or forfeitures to the government (§ 523(a)(7)). Section 523 does
not list obligations to reclaim land under environmental laws as an exception.
,2 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988). See infra notes 100-106.
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not be compelled under SMCRA to reclaim land "[tjo the
extent that fulfilling his obligation to reclaim the site would
force (him) to spend money . ".. 13
This Comment analyzes the Whizco opinion in the context
of the automatic stay,' 4 discretionary stay,
5 and discharge 6
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The analysis first compares
Penn Terra v. Department of Environmental Resources'7 with
Whizco. Penn Terra involved application of the Code's auto-
matic stay and discretionary stay provisions, whereas Whizco
involved application of the discharge provision. Next the Com-
ment considers the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Ohio v. Kovacs,' 8 a case which influenced the Sixth Circuit's
analysis in Whizco. The Comment concludes by discussing the
,3 Id. at 150.
14 11 U.S.C. § 362. Subsection (a) of this section provides, in part, for the
automatic stay of:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate,
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this
title.
Id.
Subsection (c)(2) provides that stays other than those of acts against property of
the bankrupt estate continue until the earliest of the following:
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; and
(C) if the case is a case under Chapter 7 of this title concerning an
individual or a case under Chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, the time a
discharge is granted or denied.
Id.
35 11 U.S.C. § 105.
-6 11 U.S.C. § 727. A proceeding to discharge debts under this provision is
commonly referred to as a "Chapter 7" proceeding. The provision states, in part:
Except as provided in Section 523 of this title a discharge ... discharges
the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for
relief under this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is determined
under Section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the
commencement of the case, whether or not a proof of claim based on
any such debt or liability is filed under Section 501 of this title, and
whether or not a claim based on any such debt or liability is allowed
under Section 502 of this title.
Id.
17 733 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1984).
Is 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
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significance of Whizco and its potential impact upon the en-
forcement of environmental reclamation orders.
I. APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. SMCRA
Under SMCRA Congress has established a comprehensive,
nationwide program to protect the "environment from the ad-
verse effects of surface coal mining operations."' 19 To this end,
the Act "assure[s] that adequate procedures are undertaken to
reclaim surface areas as contemporaneously as possible with
the surface coal mining operations. '
'20
Under SMCRA a coal operator cannot conduct surface coal
mining without a permit. 21 All permits must "require that ...
surface coal mining operations will meet all applicable perform-
ance standards "2.... 22 The Act spells out specific performance
standards, including numerous reclamation procedures. 23
SMCRA also provides for sanctions against a permittee24
or his agents when they fail to comply with orders from 'the
Secretary of the Interior [Secretary] to reclaim the surface of
mined land. Specifically, the Secretary may request the Attor-
ney General to file suit in United States District Court. The
court may then grant permanent or temporary injunctions,
restraining orders, or "any other appropriate order ....
B. The Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code affords a debtor three types of relief.
The automatic stay26 and discretionary stay27 provisions supply
temporary relief. The discharge provision 28 grants permanent
relief.
SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a).
20 SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202(e).
2- SMCRA § 506, 30 U.S.C. § 1256(a).
- SMCRA § 515, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(a).
13 See generally, SMCRA § 515, 30 U.S.C. § 1265.
- SMCRA §§ 503-504, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253-1254. A "permittee" is one who has
secured a permit under SMCRA, which allows the surface mining of coal from land.
25 SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(c).
26 Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362.
27 Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 105.
22 Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 727.
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1. The Automatic Stay
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an automatic
and temporary stay of the "commencement or continuation"
of certain legal proceedings against the debtor immediately
upon the filing of a petition for bankruptcy. 29 Similarly, the
automatic stay applies to the enforcement of judgments ob-
tained before commencement of bankruptcy. 30 The stay termi-
nates when the court grants or denies a discharge of debts.
3'
Section 362 does not stay the commencement or continua-
tion of actions by a governmental unit to enforce police or
regulatory powers. 32 Specifically, it does not stay enforcement
of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an
action by a governmental unit to enforce the unit's police and
regulatory power. 3 The legislative history of Section 362 ex-
plains the police power exception to the automatic stay:
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of ac-
tions and proceedings by governmental units to enforce police
or regulatory powers. Thus, where a governmental unit is
suing a debtor to prevent or stop a violation of fraud, envi-
ronmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar
police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for
violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed
under the automatic stay. 34
2. The Discretionary Stay
Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the bank-
ruptcy court, in its discretion, to enjoin temporarily other courts
from enforcing orders which are not automatically stayed by
Section 362.15 In other words, the bankruptcy court may stay
a police or regulatory action. The discretionary stay is unlike
29 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). See supra note 14.
30 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2).
11 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). See supra note 14.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
33 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5).
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5838, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 340 reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 5963, 6299.
31 See Penn Terra v. Dep't. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 273 (3rd Cir.
1984).
1989-901
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the Section 362 stay, which kicks in automatically upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition. Section 105 places upon the




Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, the discharge provi-
sion, affords a debtor permanent relief. The provision states in
part: "Except as provided in Section 52317 of this title, a
discharge . . . discharges the debtor from all debts that arose
before the date of the order for relief under this chapter ....
(emphasis added)
The Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" as "liability on a
claim." ' 39 The definition of "claim" includes the "right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to
an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unse-
cured. "40
II. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF LINKAGE BETWEEN
THE STAY PROVISIONS AND THE DISCHARGE PROVISION
The automatic stay and discretionary stay provisions as well
as the discharge provision relieve the debtor of certain financial
obligations. If the debtor's obligation, for example an injunc-
tion, is reduceable to a money expenditure, the obligation might
qualify as a debt which the court may stay and ultimately
discharge.
The three provisions operate differently. The automatic stay
provision, Section 362, stays judicial proceedings, but provides
exceptions for specific types of proceedings, such as injunctive
actions used by the government to enforce its police powers.
The discretionary stay, Section 105, operates similarly. On the
other hand, the discharge provision, Section 727, contains no
16 S. REP. No. 989, supra note 34, at 51; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 34, at
342.
" See supra note 11 for exceptions of § 523.
38 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
39 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).
- 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B).
[VOL. 5:171
SMCRA AND BANKRUPTCY
"police powers" exception. Instead, under Section 727, the
court discharges the debtor's debts, which may include obli-
gations imposed through governmental police powers. There-
fore, under both stay provisions and also the discharge
provision, the government can possibly deter the Code's fresh
start goal. However, in practice such interference will more
likely occur under the police and regulatory powers exception
to the automatic stay.
4'
Notwithstanding the differences between the stay provisions
and the discharge provision, an argument can be made that a
"police and regulatory powers" exception should be read into
the discharge provision. Whizco involved the permanent dis-
charge of a debt under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
42
The government attorney in Whizco asserted in his brief the
applicability of the temporary stay's police and regulatory pow-
ers exception to the discharge provision.
43
However, the court did not address this argument. Before
discussing Whizco's holding, 4 the Comment focuses upon the
merit of the government attorney's argument. Penn Terra, a
temporary stay case from the Third Circuit, helps to explain
this issue.
A. Penn Terra
1. Third Circuit's Decision
In Penn Terra45 the Third Circuit described the general
policy behind the temporary or automatic stay provision: "The
41 See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
41 United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988).
4" Brief for Appellant at 10-14, Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (No. 87-5317) [hereinafter
Appellant's Brief]. Commentators have made this argument. See Comment, The Future
of The Environmental Enforcement Injunction After Ohio v. Kovacs, 13 B.C. ENVTL.
As'. L. REv. 397,422 (1986); see also, Note, Clean-up Orders and the Bankruptcy
Code: An Exception to the Automatic Stay, 59 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 292, 296 n.14
(1985). Both of the above pieces indicate Kovacs is "clearly distinguishable from"
Penn Terra v. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, a Third Circuit case involving the automatic
stay provision. Although Kovacs involved the discharge provision, these commentators
distinguished the two cases because of the presence of a receiver in Kovacs. For a
detailed discussion of Penn Terra and its significance, see infra text accompanying
notes 45-78.
" See infra notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
"' 733 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1984)(Penn Terra involved a mandatory injunction
which required the debtor to reclaim coal surface mine sites).
1989-901
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general policy ... is to grant complete, immediate, albeit tem-
porary relief to the debtor from creditors, and to prevent
dissipation of the debtor's assets before orderly distribution to
creditors can be effected."
'46
The issue decided in Penn Terra concerned whether a man-
datory injunction requiring backfilling, sealing, and spreading
topsoil over a mine site was a "money judgment. ' 47 If classified
as a money judgment, the injunctive obligation would not fall
within the police and regulatory powers exception to the au-
tomatic stay. Consequently, the automatic stay would prohibit
the government from enforcing the injunction. The bankruptcy
court in Penn Terra had reasoned that a money judgment is
anything which costs money to enforce.4 8 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals subsequently rejected this broad definition
of money judgment. The court concluded the definition un-
workable, because "[in contemporary times, almost everything
costs something."49
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit adopted a
multi-factor test to determine whether the reclamation order as
a mandatory injunction was equivalent to a money judgment.
According to the court, a true injunction (one that would not
be stayed under Section 362), possesses the following charac-
teristics: 1) It is not intended to provide compensation for past
injuries; 2) it is not reduceable to a sum certain; 3) it does not
seek monies on behalf of the governmental unit as a creditor;
and 4) it prevents future harm and restores the environment.50
The court applied this test and concluded that Pennsylvania's
mandatory injunction was not equivalent to a money judg-
ment. 5' Thus, the court did not automatically stay enforcement
of the restoration order.
2. Penn Terra Compared to Whizco
Whizco has facts similar to Penn Terra.52 Both involved
governmental units which sought to force defendants to reclaim
41 Id. at 271.
41 Id. at 272.
41 Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 277.
41 Id. at 278.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
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surface mine sites. Moreover, the governmental units in both
cases sought some type of injunctive relief. The debtors in both
cases would have had to spend money to comply with their
injunctive obligations. 3 Finally, neither governmental unit at-
tempted to claim traditional money damages.1
4
A major difference between the two cases concerned the
debtor relief provisions at issue. Unlike Penn Terra, Whizco
involved the discharge provision. In Whizco, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the injunction requiring Whizco to reclaim its
site was really a "debt" under Section 727. Since the injunction
required the debtor to expend money, the court held it dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. In essence, the Sixth Circuit used
the same test the Third Circuit had rejected as unworkable, 5
albeit under different sections of the Code.
A deeper reading of Whizco and Penn Terra shows how
the cases can be reconciled. The cases do not simply reflect
opposing legal interpretations or policy orientations of two
circuits. Referring to the difference between the two bankruptcy
provisions, the Penn Terra court implied in a footnote that its
definition of money judgment for purposes of the automatic
stay might not apply to a definition of "debt" in the context
of discharge. 6 Because the two sections operate to accomplish
different goals, different rules should apply to the automatic
stay provision and the discharge provision.
The Penn Terra court observed that the automatic stay's
goal is to provide immediate relief to the debtor and to preserve
11 Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 270. The court ordered Penn Terra to complete
backfilling and final grading, submit updated erosion and sedimentation plans, seal a
deep mine, and complete top soil spreading, mulching, and seeding. The total cost
was estimated to "greatly exceed" $13,500.00. See also infra note Ill and accompa-
nying text. (Lueking, a defendent in Whizco, listed among his debts a disputed
obligation to the Office of Surface Mining for $224,000.00 for "reclamation assess-
ments").
4 Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 270 (State sought preliminary injunction); Whizco,
841 F.2d at 148 (United States sought permanent injunction.)
5 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
16 Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 277 n. 11. The court stated: "Since different sections
of the Bankruptcy Code are at issue which involve different policies and considera-
tions, we are not prepared to declare that our decision is in conflict with Kovacs H."
Id. (referring to In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom Ohio v.
Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985)). In Kovacs II, a discharge case, the Sixth Circuit applied
the rationale it had previously used in an automatic stay case. Apparently, the Third
Circuit would agree with the use of this rationale in discharge cases, but not in
automatic stay cases.
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the debtor's assets for division among the creditors. 7 A gov-
ernmental unit's attempt to enforce an injunction against a
debtor may frustrate the asset preservation goal. if compliance
with the injunction requires money expenditure before liqui-
dation, the governmental unit could effectively circumvent the
Code's priority system for payment of claims to creditors.58
3. The Discretionary Stay Provision
Section 105 of the Code, the Discretionary Stay Provision, 9
responds to the threat posed by an injunction. Under this
section the bankruptcy court, in its discretion, can stay enforce-
ment of court orders which are not stayed automatically by
Section 36 2 .60 The presence of this provision shows that Con-
gress "recognized that in some circumstances, bankruptcy pol-
icy must yield to higher priorities." ' 6' The discretionary stay
provision demonstrates that the exercise of police and regula-
tory power "may run so contrary to the policy of the Bank-
ruptcy Code that it should not be permitted."
'62
B. Invoking the Discretionary Stay
The Penn Terra court addressed discretionary stays but did
not provide clear guidelines for bankruptcy courts to determine
whether the exercise of a particular police power runs "so
contrary" to the Code's policy to invoke the provision. The
court merely stated that discretionary stays "will be granted or
issued under the usual rules for the issuance of injunctions.
63
One commentator insists the Penn Terra opinion imposes a
requirement on the trustee of the bankrupt estate to show the
following four factors to obtain a Section 105 injunction:
64
" See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 507 provides for division of the debtor's assets according to the
priority of the claim. A money judgment in favor of a governmental unit ranks at the
bottom of the priority heirarchy, because the government qualifies as a "general
unsecured creditor." In a typical bankruptcy liquidation, general unsecured creditors
are rarely paid . See also Comment, supra note 43 at 429.
- 11 U.S.C. § 105. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
60 See e.g., Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273.
61 Id. at 278.
'z Id. at 273.
63 Id.
" A Section 105 injunction, or discretionary stay would enjoin the government
from proceeding with its action to compel the debtor to undertake reclamation.
[VOL. 5:171
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1. The [bankrupt] estate would suffer irreparable harm un-
less the discretionary stay is granted.
2. On balance, the injury to the estate would be greater than
injury to the government unless the discretionary stay is
granted.
3. The debtor has a high probability of success on the merits
in the dispute with the government.
4. Relief granted by the discretionary stay would not be
contrary to the public interest.
6 5
Bankruptcy courts do not necessarily apply discretionary
stays in the deferential manner suggested above. One bank-
ruptcy court recently observed that issuance of a discretionary
stay "[ifs appropriate where the threatened state activity would
unduly interfere with the proper functioning of the Bankruptcy
Code." 66 Furthermore, the court noted that the "high proba-
bility for success on the merits" factor (factor 3 above) referred
to "whether the debtor can show that enforcement of the state
laws will unduly interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication.
'67
In other words, the third factor refers to success on the merits
in the bankruptcy action, rather than success in the underlying
environmental enforcement action. Under this test, individuals
who are admittedly guilty of SMCRA violations could still
obtain a discretionary stay of a reclamation order, despite the
slim probability for "success on the merits" in a SMCRA
action.
Notwithstanding the lack of clear guidance in Section 105,
a bankruptcy court's determination under that section is re-
viewed on an abuse of discretion standard.6 8 Therefore, a re-
viewing court will not likely overturn the grant or denial of a
discretionary stay on the basis that the lower court did not
correctly balance the goals of the Code against the goals of an
environmental protection statute. 69 Although Congress may have
615 Comment, supra note 43 at 414.
In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 70 Bankr. 786, 789 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987).
61 Id. at 793 n.3. The opposing interpretation would be that "success on the
merits" means the debtor's chance of success in the underlying dispute over recla-
mation or other environmental obligations in dispute. Obviously, if courts were to
adopt this interpretation, bankrupt debtors with clear obligations under environmental
laws could never stay actions to enforce those obligations, no matter how grave the
interference with the Bankruptcy Code.
61 See e.g., Penn Terra, 733 F. 2d at 274.
69 See Morris, State Enforcement of Environmental Laws Against Bankrupt
Entities, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), 10143, 10145 (1986).
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intended automatic stays to yield to environmental concerns, a
bankruptcy court, can make the police and regulatory powers
exception a nullity by balancing interests in its own discretion
under Section 105.70
A comparison of the discretionary stay provision with the
discharge provision shows why the former does not apply to
the latter. First, Section 105, by its own terms, applies only to
temporary stays. Section 727, the discharge provision, contains
no comparable provision for "balancing the equities." The
absence of a comparable section tends to discredit the argument
that, under the present statutory scheme, bankruptcy courts
should balance environmental concerns when granting a dis-
charge. 71 Secondly, a bankruptcy court grants or denies discre-
tionary stays on the basis of "traditional injunctive powers of
a court of equity." ' 72 On the other hand, a court may deny a
discharge only for grounds specifically enumerated in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 73 For this reason, the term "police and regulatory
powers" as used in Section 362 "[s]hould be construed broadly
.. .. , However, in light of the Bankruptcy Code's primary
purpose of providing debtors a fresh start, 7 objections to dis-
charge should be construed strictly against the person objecting
to discharge and liberally in favor of the debtor. Finally, even
nondischargeable claims, such as claims filed by secured cred-
itors, are sometimes subject to a temporary stay. 76
70 But see id. at 10145. Morris argues that 11 U.S.C. § 959(b) may render illegal
a discretionary stay where the debtor is in current violation of state environmental
law. Section 959(b) provides that "[a] trustee, receiver or manager . . . including a
debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession ...
according to the requirements of the valid state laws of the State in which such
property is situated." Cf. Midlantic Nat'l. Bank v. New Jersey Dep't. of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986). In Midlantic, a bankruptcy trustee attempted to
abandon a waste oil facility. Pennsylvania law prohibited abandonment under the
circumstances. The Supreme Court ruled that a trustee may not abandon property in
contravention of a state statute which protects public health and safety. The Court
required the trustee to "formulat[e] conditions" that adequately protect the public
health and safety before abandoning the property. Id. at 507.
1l See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying notes.
72 Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273.
71 See e.g., In re Harpe, 354 F.Supp. 59 (M.D. Ga. 1973); In re Hale, 274
F.Supp. 813 (W.D. Va. 1967).
74 Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273.
71 See e.g., In re Lubin, 61 Bankr. 511, 513 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1986)(stating
that objections to a debt discharge are liberally construed in favor of a debtor).
76 For example, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) exempts from discharge debts which result
from willful and malicious injury to another. They are nevertheless automatically
stayed under Section 362, since that section provides no such exemption from a stay.
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The foregoing discussion shows the lack of correlation be-
tween the stay provisions and the discharge provision. The
conclusion justifies the Whizco court's rejection of the govern-
ment's argument that the police powers exception of Section
362 applies to the discharge provision.
III. THE OHio v. KOVACS DISCHARGE RULE
Cases dealing with bankruptcy discharge of environmental
cleanup obligations focus upon the Code's definition of "debt"
as a "liability on a claim." 7 Under the Code, only "debts"
are dischargeable. 78 Accordingly, the definition of "debt" re-
ceives more attention than the definition of "claim." The con-
troversy generally concerns whether an environmental cleanup
obligation is a "debt." Ohio v. Kovacs79 presented the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to fashion a definition of "debt"
and thereby state a rule for the discharge of injunctive obli-
gations. However, the Court declined to formulate a general
rule, and instead issued a narrow, fact-specific opinion.
80
Kovacs formed the cornerstone for Whizco. The case's com-
plicated facts, in addition to the unclear implications of the
holding, made Kovacs open to interpretation. 8 In Whizco the
Sixth Circuit liberally interpreted Kovacs.82 Other courts con-
77 See e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); Whizco, 841 F.2d 147.
Is 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) provides as follows:
Except as provided in Section 523 of this title, a discharge . . . discharges
the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for
relief under this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is determined
under Section 502 on this title as if such claim had arisen before the
commencement of the case ....
79 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
10 Id. at 275 (stating "The question before us is whether, in the circumstances
present here, Kovacs' obligation under the injunction is a 'debt' or 'liability on a
claim' subject to discharge ...." (emphasis added)).
"1 Counsel for the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER)
said of Kovacs: "If not a perfect example of the axiom that bad facts make bad law,
then the somewhat complicated facts in Kovacs have certainly made unclear law."
Morris, supra note 69, at 10145. The government attorneys in Whizco unsuccessfully
argued that Kovacs did not apply by trying to distinguish Kovacs on the facts. The
government argued that the presence of a receiver was crucial to the Kovacs decision.
Since there was no alternate remedy such as receivership in Whizco, they argued that
the injunction should be enforced despite Kovacs. See generally, Appellant's Brief,
supra note 43.
"1 See infra text accompanying notes 107-20.
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fronted with facts similar to Whizco, might not follow the
Sixth Circuit's liberal interpretation.
83
A. The Facts of Kovacs
Kovacs involved a dispute between the operator of a haz-
ardous waste disposal site and the State of Ohio. 84 Ohio filed
suit against Kovacs (the operator) for water pollution viola-
tions. Kovacs eventually signed a settlement agreement.8" The
agreement enjoined Kovacs from causing further pollution or
bringing additional wastes onto the site (the prohibitory in-
junction). It also required him to remove certain wastes from
the property (the mandatory injunction).8 6 When Kovacs failed
to comply with these terms, Ohio sought appointment of a
receiver87 to take possession of the property as well as Kovacs'
other assets. Before completion of the receiver's job, Kovacs
filed for protection under the bankruptcy laws.
88
Ohio filed a motion in state court to discover Kovacs'
income and assets. The State also sought a declaration from
the United States Bankruptcy Court that Kovacs' obligations
under the settlement agreement were not dischargeable because
they did not constitute a "debt" or "liability on a claim."
'8 9
The Bankruptcy Court stayed the discovery action in state court
See infra note 138.
', Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276.
85 Id.
86 Id. 42 AM. JuR. 2D Injunctions § 17 (1969) describes prohibitory injunctions
as restraining the commission or continuance of an act. Section 16 describes a man-
datory injunction as an order which compels some positive action involving a change
of existing circumstances.
1, In Kovacs, Ohio law provided for the appointment of a receiver. Kovacs, 469
U.S. at 276. A receiver "is a person appointed by a court to take into his custody,
control, and management the property or funds of another pending judicial action
concerning them." 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 1 (1952).
11 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276. Having first filed under Chapter 11, Kovacs then
converted to Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings. The distinction between Chapter 11
and Chapter 7 proceedings is significant. Daniel Cowans describes Chapter 11 as "a
remedy for a debtor with a considerable amount of debts who does not wish to
surrender all non-exempt assets to creditors and to abandon all efforts to handle debt
problems." CowANs, CowANs BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 313 (1989). The
purpose of a Chapter I proceeding is debtor rehabilitation: "A plan of reorganization
is to be prepared and submitted to creditors which plan must promise creditors at
least as much and probably more than they would receive under Chapter 7 liquida-
tion." Id. at 314.
89 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 277.
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and held the settlement obligations were dischargeable debts
under Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code.9°
Ohio argued before the bankruptcy court that Kovacs' ob-
ligations under the mandatory injunctions did not constitute
debts as envisioned in the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 7 of the
Code provides for the discharge of all "debts" 9' except for an
enumerated list of exceptions under Section 523.92 The Code
defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." 93 "Claim" includes
the "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance
if such breach gives rise to a right to payment . . . . ",94 Ohio
did not attempt to argue that Kovacs' obligations fell within
any of the enumerated exceptions. Instead, the state simply
argued that the obligations were not "debts." 95
B. The Holding of Kovacs
The Supreme Court accepted the bankruptcy court's deci-
sion, holding that the receiver wanted money from Kovacs after
bankruptcy to contribute to cleanup cost." 96 The Court did not
hold that all injunctions which require the expenditure of money
are "debts." The court explained: "On the facts before it, and
with the receiver in control of the site, we cannot fault the
Court of Appeals for concluding that the cleanup order had
been converted into an obligation to pay money, an obligation
that was dischargeable in bankruptcy."
97
The presence of a receiver appears important to the Su-
preme Court's decision, although the Court did not term this
circumstance as dispositive. 98 The Court concluded by stating
90 Id. at 281.
9- 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
92 11 U.S.C. § 523 provides nine types of debts which are not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. See supra note 11 for examples.
9' 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).
9' 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(b).
95 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 277.
91 Id. at 283.
97 Id. In fact, counsel for the state of Ohio admitted at oral argument that
"after the receiver was appointed, the only performance it- sought from Kovacs was
the payment of money." Id.
98 Id. The Supreme Court stated, "The injunction surely obligated Kovacs to
clean up the site. But when he failed to do so, rather than prosecute Kovacs under
the environmental laws or bring civil or criminal contempt proceedings, the State
secured the appointment of a receiver ...." Id. at 282.
When the Sixth Circuit considered this case in Kovacs II, they also indicated the
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what it did not decide: "[W]e do not suggest that Kovacs'
discharge will shield him from prosecution for having violated
the environmental laws of Ohio or for criminal contempt for
not performing his obligation under the injunction prior to
bankruptcy."99
IV. UNITED STATES V. WHIzco: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE KOVACS DISCHARGE RULE
A. Facts
Pursuant to his authority under SMCRA, the Secretary of
the Interior filed a complaint'0° in United States District Court
against Whizco, Inc. and Donovan Lueking, the company's
vice president and sole shareholder. The Secretary charged
Whizco and Leuking for failure to abate reclamation violations
at a surface mine in Tennessee. 10 The complaint requested a
mandatory injunction ordering Lueking to reclaim the site. The
significance of a receiver's presence. In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 985 (6th Cir.
1983)(bankruptcy discharge case upheld by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs).
The Circuit Court also found significance in Ohio's attempt to discover Kovacs' assets.
Id. at 987. However, the Sixth Circuit concluded by stating, "Kovacs cannot personally
clean up the waste .... He cannot perform the affirmative obligations imposed upon
him by the State court except by paying money or transferring over his own financial
resources." Id. at 988. So, it is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio's
attempt to collect money made the obligation a "debt", or whether Kovacs' inability
to comply other than by paying money made it a "debt."
In fact, the Supreme Court, in Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 282, indicated uncertainty
about the basis for the Sixth Circuit holding: "As we understand it, the Court of
Appeals held that, in the circumstances, the cleanup obligation had been reduced to
a monetary obligation. We do not disturb this judgment." (emphasis added)
99 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284. Under Section 523(a)(7), the Bankruptcy Code
disallows the discharge of certain fines, penalties, and forfeitures to the government.
The Supreme Court's statement regarding contempt sanctions apparently applies only
to actions for which the bankrupt party could have been found in contempt prior to
the time of filing a bankruptcy petition.
'o In most cases, a state agency, rather than the Secretary of the Interior, enforces
the provisions of SMCRA. The statute provides for state enforcement where the state
demonstrates to the Secretary that it "has the capability of carrying out the provisions
of [SMCRA]." 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a). Tennessee is one of the states which has chosen
not to qualify under SMCRA for state enforcement authority as a "primacy" state.
Rocxy MOUNTAIN MnERAL LAW FOUNDATION, 5 AMERICAN LAW O MINING, § 172.13
(2d ed. 1989). States with approved programs include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisana, Maryland, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
10, Whizco, 841 F.2d at 148.
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government also requested a prohibitory injunction preventing
the company and Lueking from mining coal anywhere in the
United States until complete reclamation of the Tennessee site. 02
Lueking was involved in Chapter 11 reorganization
proceedings'03 in bankruptcy court at the time the Secretary
filed the SMCRA complaint. One day after the Secretary filed,
Lueking converted the reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding.' °4 The district court granted the prohibitory injunc-
tion but refused to compel reclamation on the ground that the
reclamation obligation was a "debt" dischargeable under Chap-
ter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 0 Unlike Kovacs, the court did
not appoint a receiver, and the government made no attempt
to discover Lueking's assets.' °6
B. Holding
The United States appealed the denial of injunctive relief
and argued that the district court erred in holding the manda-
tory injunction was a dischargeable debt. 07 Government attor-
neys asserted that under the particular circumstances of the
Whizco permit, 0 the Secretary did not have statutory author-
ization to reclaim the site and demand payment from the de-
fendants.' °9 Unlike the State Attorney General in Kovacs, the
Secretary had no authority to seek appointment of a receiver.
102 Id.
103 See supra note 88 (distinguishing between Chapter 11 reorganization and
Chapter 7 discharge).
101 Actions under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 are commonly denominated Chapter
11 proceedings. Actions under 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 are commonly denominated
Chapter 7 proceedings. Under Chapter 7 actions, the bankrupt estate is liquidated to
satisfy creditors.
1o Whizco, 841 F.2d at 148. Lueking did not dispute the injunction prohibiting
him from engaging in surface mining activity in the future.
106 Another difference with Kovacs concerns the issue of whether criminal con-
tempt sanctions are dischargeable. In Kovacs, the Supreme Court made reference to
the nondischargeability of criminal contempt sanctions. See supra note 99 and accom-
panying text. However, this caveat does not appear to apply to Lueking, since the
Court's statement applies only to post-petition punishment of pre-petition contempt.
Because Lueking filed his petition immediately after the government filed its initial
complaint, there was no pre-petition contempt to punish. Thus, the Whizco court's
holding does not appear to conflict with this aspect of Kovacs.
107 See generally Appellant's Brief, supra note 43.
101 See infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text explaining the permit pro-
grams.
1o Whizco, 841 F.2d at 148.
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Therefore, since a mandatory injuction was the Secretary's sole
remedy, the government argued that it should not be discharged
as a "debt" in bankruptcy." 0
The Sixth Circuit rejected the government's argument that
dischargeability of injunctive relief depends upon the availabi-
lity of an alternative remedy at law. Instead, the court found
the dispositive criterion was whether compliance with the in-
junction requires expenditure of money. "To the extent that
fulfulling his obligation to reclaim the site would force the
defendant to spend money," the court held, "the obligation
was a liability on a claim . .. ."I
The United States had argued that a rule based upon ex-
penditure of money by the debtor would make all injunctions
meaningless." 2 Citing Penn Terra, government attorneys pointed
out that "[i]n contemporary times, almost everything costs
something.""' The court did not touch upon this issue.
Strict application of the expenditure of money rule would
appear to prevent enforcement of reclamation orders against
any bankrupt debtor. Even a debtor physically able to reclaim
a site would have to expend nominal sums. The Whizco court
failed to address this argument. However, the court cited a
Florida Bankruptcy Court's opinion 1 4 with approval and made
reference to that court's conclusion that "Congress intended a
Appellant's Brief, supra note 43, at 7.
Whizco, 841 F.2d at 150. The court added that "[t]o the extent that the
defendant can comply with the Secretary's orders without spending money, his bank-
ruptcy did not discharge his obligation to comply with the orders." Id. at 151. This
order provided little consolation to the government. Lueking, 63 years of age, had
surrendered all his non-exempt property to the bankruptcy trustee. His total income
amounted to $576.00, which he used to support himself, his wife, and their handi-
capped teenage son. He possessed no equipment with which to perform the reclamation
work. He also did not have enough money to pay for the remedial work. Moreover,
he was physically incapable to do the work by himself. Brief for Appellee at 3, United
States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988)(No. 87-5317).
Appellant's Brief, supra note 43, at 12.
"' Penn Terra v. Dep't. of Envtl. Protection, 733 F.2d 267, 278 (3rd Cir. 1984).
" In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985), rev'd other grounds,
55 Bankr. 355 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). In this case, petitioner Robinson unlawfully
excavated and filled swampland without a permit. The Bankruptcy Court stated that
automatic stay considerations did not apply to Chapter 7 discharge of a debt, and
that there was little correlation between the two provisions. (The "debt" was Robin-
son's obligation to restore the swampland to its original condition). The court held
that the obligation was discharged in bankruptcy, but emphasized that the state could,




broadly inclusive definition of claim . ... "I" Another reason
the Whizco court did not address the Penn Terra type argument
pertained to the differences between the two cases. 1 6 Penn
Terra was decided in the context of the automatic stay. Whereas
courts will broadly construe the discharge provision in the
debtor's favor, courts will less likely construe the stay provi-
sions in such manner.
17
The Supreme Court in Kovacs emphasized the importance
of the appointment of a receiver."' However, the absence of a
receiver in Whizco should not be dispositive. Both the receiver
in Kovacs and the injunction in Whizco accomplished the same
goal-to extract payment from a bankrupt debtor in order to
reclaim land. The Sixth Circuit recognized this similarity. Ac-
cordingly, the court stated that "[w]e look at the substance of
what the plaintiff seeks, rather than the form of the relief
sought, [and] we see that the plaintiff is really seeking pay-
ment."" 9 Thus, the Whizco court's analysis appears reasonable
in light of Kovacs.
V. THE IMPACT OF WHIZCO ON SMCRA ENFORCEMENT
The Whizco court's discharge rule, which operates to relieve
bankrupt operators of their statutorily imposed reclamation
duties, seemingly frustrates SMCRA's land preservation goal.
To some extent Congress has addressed this effect of the Whizco
rule. SMCRA includes certain provisions which insure comple-
tion of reclamation.12
0
"IWhizco, 841 F.2d at 150 (citing In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1985).
16 See supra notes 45-76 and accompanying text.
"I See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 277-78.
"8 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
"I Whizco, 841 F. 2d at 150.
120 For example, surface mining permits may be witheld for subsequent mine sites
if an applicant has previously failed to reclaim land pursuant to the requirements of
a permit. SMCRA provides for "permit blocking" at SMCRA § 510, 30 U.S.C. §
1260(c). This section states that "where the schedule or other information available
to the regulating authority indicates that any surface coal mining operation owned or
controlled by the applicant is currently in violation of this chapter... the permit shall
not be issued until the applicant submits proof that such violation has been corrected
or is in the process of being corrected .... "
SMCRA also provides for an Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund. SMCRA §
481, 30 U.S.C. § 1231. Using this Fund, the Secretary (or state) may enter property
"adversely affected by past coal mining practices... to restore, reclaim, abate, control,
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The bonding program is one such mechanism. 121 However,
at the time the Whizco case occurred, the operators did not
have to post a reclamation bond. SMCRA originally created a
two-stage permit program. 22 Lueking and Whizco obtained
their permits under "Phase One," a temporary regulatory pro-
gram with no requirement for posting a federal reclamation
bond.12 1 Phase One permittees have been substantially elimi-
nated now. Permittees under Phase Two, the permanent pro-
gram, must post reclamation bonds. 124 On the surface, the
present bonding requirement seems to abate the potential im-
pact that the Whizco discharge rule may have upon SMCRA
enforcement actions. Yet, this explanation probably fails.
If reclamation costs exceed the penalty amount of the bond,
the excess cost could be dischargeable under the Whizco rule.
Moreover, the Whizco rule will probably strain the ability of
surety companies to recover from their defaulted principals.
Unlike other federal environmental statutes, SMCRA does
not allow the Secretary to compel subsequent purchasers of
stripped land to reclaim the land. 125 Enforcement action can be
taken only against the operator of the mine. 26 Thus, if a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee sells unreclaimed land to a third
party, 27 SMCRA does not require the third party to reclaim
the land.
or prevent the adverse effects [of the mining]." 30 U.S.C § 1231(a). Section 1231(b)
provides for collection of "reclamation fees" from current mining operations. How-
ever, Section 1231(c) stipulates that the fund is to be used for "reclamation and
restoration of land and water resources adversely affected by past coal mining ....
(emphasis added) Thus, since SMCRA was passed in 1977, expenditure of fund
proceeds is limited to pre-1977 mining operations.
121 SMCRA § 501, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1279. Section 1259 makes issuance of a
permit contingent upon filing an adequate performance bond. Section 1259(a) requires
the bond to be of an amount sufficient to complete reclamation of the mined land.
When setting the amount of the bond, the agency charged with issuing the permit
(Secretary of the Interior if federally supervised or state agency if approved state
program) considers the projected difficulty of reclamation. Specific factors to be
considered include topography, geology, hydrology, and revegetation potential. 30
C.F.R. § 800.14 (1987).
2 SMCRA § 501, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1279.
123 Id. See also Appellant's Brief, supra note 43, at 3.
-- SMCRA § 509, 30 U.S.C. § 1259.
121 Appellant's Brief, supra note 43 at 6-7 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1252(d), § 1256, §
1271(a), (c), § 1291(13), (18), (19) and United States v. Dix Fork Coal Co., 692 F.2d
436 (6th Cir. 1982)).
126 SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(c).
127 However, if the unreclaimed land presents a hazard to public health and safety
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Even if a court could order the bankrupt party to reclaim
land subsequently transferred to a third party, the new owner
may have a legal right to object to the reclamation. In Cordero
Mining Co. v. Vandyke, 12 Cordero Mining sold unreclaimed
land to Vandyke. Cordero subsequently attempted to comply
with a mandatory injunction to reclaim the land. Vandyke, a
purchaser without notice of the reclamation obligation, refused
to allow Cordero upon the property to complete the reclama-
tion. 29 The Federal District Court for the Western District of
Virginia held that under SMCRA courts did not have jurisdic-
tion over Vandyke. Therefore, Vandyke could not be compelled
to allow Cordero upon the land. 30 The lack of authority to
hold Cordero in contempt for failing to do the impossible 3'
severely limited the government's enforcement options.
Read together, Whizco and Cordero dilute SMCRA's rec-
lamation provisions. When arguing against discharge of the
Whizco injunction, the government assumed that authority ex-
isted to force subsequent purchasers of the site to allow Lueking
to enter the land for reclamation purposes. 3 2 Since Whizco
holds that a bankrupt party cannot be compelled to reclaim
land if the reclamation costs money, and Cordero holds that a
subsequent purchaser without notice cannot be required to
cooperate, some land may lie unreclaimed indefinitely.'33
The final manner in which Whizco may affect SMCRA
enforcement pertains to illegal "wildcat" mining. The govern-
ment brings many enforcement actions under SMCRA against
in contravention of state law, the trustee may be prohibited from selling it. See supra
note 70.
1 690 F.Supp. 1497 (W.D. Va. 1988)
129 Id. at 1498-99.
30 Id. at 1500.
131 See generally, 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt § 35 (1964)(violation or disobedience
of injunctions punishable as contempt).
132 Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
5317) states:
If the land has been mined and not reclaimed in accordance with SMCRA,
the operator or his permittee or his agent may be ordered to reclaim the
site, even if the landowner objects. And, in fact, knowing interference
by the landowner would constitute a contempt of a valid court order.
"I Even if the land eventually is reclaimed, the overburden (coal and dirt which
is excavated from the land in order to mine a seam of coal) can cause serious
environmental consequences before reclamation occurs. Such consequences include
erosion, sedimentation, siltation, acid drainage, landslides and leaching of toxic chem-
icals. See FINDLEY AND FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 532 (1981).
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wildcatters who operate in violation of those provisions which
require operators to procure permits and post bonds. 3 4 If a
wildcatter files for protection under Chapter 7, the government
has no bond upon which to foreclose. Wildcatters potentially
face substantial penalties"3 which are not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 13 6 Although penalties may deter some illegal sur-
face mining, they do not address the problem of land recla-
mation. Mandatory injunctions do address the problem, but
Whizco would conceivably allow a wildcatter the same protec-
tion it allowed Lueking.
CONCLUSION
Whizco presently represents the sole Court of Appeals de-
cision concerning the dischargeability of SMCRA injunctive
obligations. Only time will tell whether other circuits will follow
the Whizco rule.
37
Unless the Supreme Court can resolve this ambiguity in an
appropriate case'3 8 or until Congress adds a police and regula-
Appellant's Brief, supra note 43, at 7 n. 3.
SMCRA § 518, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(e) provides that "Any person who willfully
and knowingly violates a condition of a permit . . . or fails or refuses to comply with
any order ... shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000,
or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both." Oddly enough, SMCRA
does not directly criminalize mining without a permit. Thus, to be subject to the
penalty under Section 1268(e), the Secretary must first issue a cessation order against
a wildcatter. If the wildcatter fails or refuses to comply with the order, he may then
be subject to criminal sanctions under this section.
- See supra notes 11 & 99 and accompanying text.
137 The Whizco rule provides that injunctions are dischargeable to the extent that
compliance therewith costs money. In describing its holding as "narrow," the Sixth
Circuit explained, "To the extent that the defendant can comply with the Secretary's
orders without spending money, his bankruptcy did not discharge his obligation to
comply with the orders." Whizco, 841 F.2d at 151. Referring to the Whizco facts,
Lueking hardly could have complied without spending money. See supra note 111.
Even if Lueking had the physical ability and the necessary earth-moving equipment to
comply with the order, he still would have had to spend money for fuel, maintenance,
and depreciation. As the Third Circuit stated in Penn Terra, "[iun contemporary
times, almost everything costs something." Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 278. The Sixth
Circuit did not discuss the possibility of a "de minimis exception" to the Whizco
rule.
.. One bankruptcy court has explicitly rejected the Whizco approach. In re Asian,
65 Bankr. 826 (Bankr. C.D. Cal 1986). Aslan entered into a contract to sell real estate
to another party, and then he refused to sell. Id. at 827. The buyer filed an action
for specific performance in state court, seeking to compel Aslan to sell the land.
Asian, however, filed a petition for bankruptcy. Id. at 828. The issue concerned
whether the debtor/trustee would be relieved of the requirement to specifically perform
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tory power exception to the discharge provision, courts will
continue to struggle with the conflict between environmental
statutes and Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. For now,
Whizco controls the outcome of many bankruptcy disputes in
the coal mining industry.
ALFRED L. BUCHANAN
on the contract to sell. Id. The court held that if the only remedy allowed by law is
non-monetary (i.e., specific performance), then: "The question to be dealt with is
whether, as a matter of state law, the non-breaching party has a right to obtain an
equitable judgment. If so, the remedy becomes a contingent claim and can be dis-
charged in bankruptcy." Id. at 831.
On the other hand, the Whizco court held the reclamation obligation was dis-
chargeable despite the alleged fact that SMCRA "does not allow the Secretary the
alternative remedy of reclaiming the site and demanding payment for the costs incurred
.Whizco, 841 F.2d at 148.
Dicta in Matter of Commonwealth Oil, 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), indicated
that the Fifth Circuit believed Kovacs accepted the automatic stay/money judgment
analysis in Penn Terra for use in the discharge context. Id. at 1187. If the Fifth
Circuit actually applies this analysis to a discharge case, the resulting split between
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits would provide the Supreme Court with an excellent
opportunity to clarify its holding in Kovacs.
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